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Abstract  
 
The escalation of natural disasters in the last two decades or so and their devastating 
effects on developing countries in general and Africa in particular, has been frequently 
mentioned in the topical literature. Devastating impacts in African and other developing 
countries have often been attributed to failure of formal (state and market) institutions 
for risk management, frequent in these countries.  While the predominance of informal 
response mechanisms has been acknowledged in these countries, they are presumed 
to disintegrate in the face of covariate shocks. This paper argues that an overly 
ambitious emphasis on states and markets and a negligence of the role of informal, 
socially embedded institutions in the effective management of natural disasters is 
grossly responsible for the negative effects of natural disasters and their perverse 
implications on Africa’s development. A multi-sector framework that can be used for 
modeling natural disaster management in Africa which has the potential of reducing the 
negative consequences of disasters is suggested. This is based on the premise that 
natural shocks must be perceived as social phenomena that are best managed with the 
participation of those involved. Empirical evidence is included, and the implications of a 
multi-stakeholder approach to managing disasters to enhance development in Africa are 
discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
The remarkable global escalation of natural disasters in the last two decades or so has 
been frequently mentioned in the literature. The period between 1990 and 2005 alone is 
said to have accounted for more than half of all recorded natural disasters, causing 
global economic losses more than seven fold greater than observed up to the 1960s 
(UNDP 2008, Van den Berg et al. 2009, ISDR 2010). Though the anthropogenic 
influence and magnitude of climate change and its effects on natural disasters remain 
largely unknown, trends point towards an escalation. In the 20th Century for example, 
sea level s are estimated to have risen between 10 and 20cm. By 2100, global 
temperatures are expected to increase in the range of 1.4 to 5.8oC increasing seasonal 
and inter-annual variability. These changes will create suitable conditions for increased 
frequency of extreme events (Nicholls and Hoozemans 1999; Nicholls, 2002; Mechler 
2004), with expected negative impacts on developing countries in general and Africa in 
particular. Munich Re (2006) for instance reports significant effects of natural disasters 
on developing country economies, leading to losses above 13% of the gross domestic 
product (GDP), compared to less than 3% of GDP in industrialized countries between 
1985 and 1999. Africa alone accounted for over 60% of the total victims (killed and 
affected) of natural disasters in 2005 (ISDR 2010).  
 
Billions of Dollars have been devoted to post disaster management on the African 
continent. The World Bank’s for instance invested over USD 7.5 billion for post-disaster 
construction in Africa between 1980 and 2000 (Gilbert and Kreimer 1999). Clearly, 
natural shocks result in income or consumption volatility, with devastating and 
sometimes irreversible effects especially on the poor (Günther and Harttgen 2009). If 
African development is to be sustained, there is an urgency to pay attention to 
managing disasters on the continent in a manner that reduces their overall effects on 
the continent’s development. For this to happen, there is a need to develop and utilize 
frameworks that can accommodate the deficient structural and institutional conditions 
for disaster management common in Africa. Failing hierarchical and market institutions 
often defect effective management of natural shocks to evade disasters, and disaster 
management through public transfers is beyond the fiscal capacity of most governments 
(Holzmann and Jorgensen 2000). Most governments are generally deficient in scientific 
and socioeconomic data for effective risk prevention, reduction, mitigation or coping and 
the dynamic responses of informal instruments to hazards active in most African 
countries have not been fully integrated into disaster management (Balgah and 
Buchenrieder, 2010). Information asymmetry thus contributes to posing natural hazards 
as a serious threat to development especially in developing countries (Benson and Clay 
2004). This hampers the wide existence and functioning of early warning systems, 
disaster monitoring and preparedness and the use of community based knowledge of 
local processes for disaster management in Africa.   
 
The failure of the state in many African countries has been described as negative fall 
outs of the World Bank and IMF – led structural adjustment programs on the continent 
(Macamo 2005). The state that was initially created to manage issues of common 
interest or to regulate the functioning of markets was generally reduced to an executive 
arm of the bourgeoisie (Evans 1975). The adoption of foreign models in many African 
countries only led to economic recess, slow pace of development and difficulties in 
containing unprecedented events such as natural disasters. 
 
This article intends to contribute to the Africanization of disaster management strategies 
as a means to boost sustainable development on the continent. While this is by no 
means a panacea for disaster management for all countries on the continent, it is 
expected to stimulate scientific discussions and empirical testing of a novel framework 
that could assist in reducing the impacts of sudden, extreme events on the continent.  
Section two will present a succinct review of the literature on the impact of disasters on 
Africa’s development. Section three will introduce the multi-sector (multi-dimensional) 
framework for disaster management. Section four will present some empirical evidence 
to support the framework, while section five will conclude the paper. 
 
2. Review of literature 
2.1.  A brief overview of natural disaster statistics1 
The glaring escalation of natural disasters is causing tremendous socioeconomic and 
psychosocial impacts around the globe. A total of 385 natural disasters killed over 297 
000 people worldwide in 2010 (Guha-Sapir et al 2011). In the same year, over 217 
million people were further affected by natural disasters, up from 198.7 million in 2009. 
These disasters caused USD 123.9 billion of economic damages, up from USD 47.6 
billion in 2009 (ibid). 
 
The situation in Africa slightly improved over this period. Thanks to improved early 
warning systems, preparedness and response, the massive mortality from Sub-Saharan 
African droughts for instance in the 1970s has not been repeated over the examined 
period (GAR 2011). The total number of victims in Africa (9.87 million) decreased in 
2010, compared to the 2000-2009 yearly averages of 15.07 million (Guha-Sapir et al 
2011). Although the total number of natural disasters decreased from 69 in2009 to 64 in 
2010, the total number of victims from Africa ranked the continent third, only after Asia 
(193.98 million) and Oceania (12.1 million) respectively in the same year.  Africa 
accounted for 4.5% of global victims in 2010, while Oceania for instance with more 
disasters accounted only for 0.3% (ibid).  
The fact that a lower frequency of disasters leads to a disproportionately higher number 
of victims suggests that there are deficiencies in the disaster management systems in 
Africa. In fact the difficulties posed by information asymmetry on the continent have 
often been reported (Benson and Clay 2004). According to Guha-Sapir et al (2011:30), 
the drop in numbers is mainly due to the absence of extensive droughts and famines in 
2010, and to the fact that “economic damages from natural disasters in Africa are 
                                                 
1  This section is mainly based on Guha-Sapir et al (2011), Annual Disaster Statistical Review. The Numbers and 
Trends, Brussels: Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). For the sake of the paper, most of 
the focus will be on Africa. 
infrequently and incompletely reported, leading to an underestimation of damage 
figures”. In other words, the inefficiency of formal (state and market) institutions in 
properly managing natural disasters in Africa presents a major handicap for the 
continent’s development (Holzmann and Jorgensen 2000, Macamo 2005). Their 
reliability and capability for information generation is doubtful. Because natural disasters 
occur within a political space, it is very likely that political ambitions can supersede 
concerns about effective disaster management, unless the two goals are compatible or 
complementary. It is about time to rethink development strategies that are appropriate 
for Africa – one that goes beyond the politics of patronage and pays attention to long 
term economic and public interests (Makoba 2011). An effective model for managing 
disasters should therefore go beyond state and market institutions to include socially 
embedded, informal mechanisms that are abundant in the continent. 
 
2.2. Formal an informal response mechanisms and their implications for 
disaster management in Africa 
Risk management arrangements include all formal and informal actions that have 
historically evolved for the purpose of providing some social protection for households in 
the event of shocks or their transformation into disasters2 (Holzmann and Jorgensen 
2000, Heitzmann et al. 2001, Holzmann et al 2003, Skoufias 2003). Broadly speaking, 
they can be split into formal (market and public based) and informal (individual or 
community based) mechanisms. Both mechanisms can be applied ex-ante or ex-post. 
Merton (1968) defined mechanisms as social processes having designated 
consequences for designated parts of a social structure. According to Merton, it is 
essential for scientists to identifying these mechanisms, establishing under what 
conditions they come into existence or not. Stinchcombe (1991:367) defined 
mechanisms as ‘bits of theory about entities at a different level (e.g. individuals) than 
the main entities being theorized about (e.g. groups), serv[ing] to make higher level 
                                                 
2  A natural disaster is the result of a complex interaction between a potentially damaging physical event (e.g. a flood 
or drought) and the vulnerability of a society, its infrastructure, economy and environment as determined by human 
behavior (Brikmann 2006). The losses from a disaster are contingent on the nature of the hazard and the vulnerability 
of the system elements. Failing states and markets increase the vulnerability of countries to natural disasters. A 
natural disaster therefore exists when a (natural) event overwhelms preventive, mitigating or coping capacities, 
necessitating nationwide or international assistance (ISDR 2010). 
theory more supple, accurate and general”. Gross (2009: 364) defines a social 
mechanism as “a more or less general sequence or set of social events or processes 
analyzed at a lower order of complexity or aggregation by which – in certain 
circumstances some cause X tends to bring about some effect Y in the realm of human 
social relations. This sequence or set may or may not be analytically reducible to the 
actions of individuals who enact it, may underwrite formal or substantive causal 
processes and may be observed, unobserved or in principle unobservable”. 
Mechanisms is used here to describe the factors that explain for instance why certain 
inputs (e.g. shocks from nature) lead to different outcomes (e.g a disaster or not). This 
is done on the premise that disasters must be seen as social phenomena that require a 
deeper reflection on why certain shocks under different conditions lead to different 
outcomes. To further illustrate this, Hedström and Swedberg (1996) and Gross (2009) 
assume an observable (non-random) relationship between two variables or events, I 
and O. The link between these two events can be expressed by the mechanism, M.  
According to these authors, what characterizes the black box is when the link between I 
and O is considered either to be void of structure or of no interest, probably because 
they cannot be observed. Thus a regression coefficient relating I to O is not enough to 
describe the causal relationship between I and O. The black box becomes critical here, 
as the regression coefficient itself does not say much about the process through which 
this relationship was established. Mechanisms in the disaster management literature 
can be formal or informal. 
 
Formal mechanisms on the one hand include for example insurance, formal savings, social 
assistance, relocation and government transfers (Holzmann and Jorgensen 2000). Informal 
mechanisms on the other hand comprise community based, socially embedded instruments that 
have been tested at local levels for preventing, mitigating and coping with shocks (Balgah et al 
2012). They describe the bundle of measures taken at household or community levels to protect 
against risks or to mitigate or cope with disasters, in the presence or absence of state and market 
based arrangements. These instruments include for instance strategic marriages, collective action 
and solidarity, migration, sale of assets, informal savings or borrowing, crop diversification, kinship 
arrangements and membership in groups and networks (Holzmann and Jorgensen 2000). 
Membership in groups and networks are fundamental to social capital, an important component of 
risk management. The capacity of systems for resilience, adaptation or coping with shocks rests 
in a proper assessment of the functioning and ability to rely on both formal (state, market) and 
informal response mechanisms, such as social capital (ISDR 2012). An overly dependence on 
state and market institutions do not seem to be appropriate for Africa, where state and market 
failures are rampant (Holzmann and Jorgensen 2000, Makoba 2011). It is probably true that when 
the formal is missing or deficient as is the case in many African countries, the informal may 
occupy a much more important place in the proper management of disasters (Balgah and 
Buchenrieder 2010). A proper mix of state, market and informal institutions seems better for 
managing disasters on the continent, as the strengths and weaknesses of each instrument can be 
adequately taken into consideration in the management process. States and markets often 
provide the institutional frameworks under which disaster management operates. Through 
informal mechanisms, indigenous communities offer alternative knowledge and perspectives for 
disaster management based on locally developed processes, practices and experiences (Berkes 
et al 2000). The formal and informal therefore seem to present an acceptable blend for a proper 
management of natural disasters in Africa, in a way that can promote sustainable development on 
the continent. 
 
Unfortunately, microeconomic theory predicts that informal response mechanisms are capable of 
supporting the proper management of idiosyncratic (individual) shocks such as the illness of a 
household member, but often disintegrate in the presence of covariate (widespread) shocks such 
as a flood or drought. Only formal instruments are resilient under widespread disaster conditions 
(Alwang et al 2001, Holzmann et al 2003). In other words, informal instruments are less resilient 
to covariate natural events as compared to formal ones.  Informal instruments constitute the main 
source of disaster management in Africa – as the states and market institutions often fail 
(Holzmann et al 2003, Macamo 2005, Makoba 2011). Very often therefore from a World Bank – 
led microeconomic theoretical position, it is conjectured that the predominance of informal 
response mechanisms on the African continent and the failure of state and market institutions for 
disaster management are jointly responsible for the catastrophic nature of natural disasters in 
Africa, that result from improper management (Holzmann and Jorgensen 2000, Holzmann et al 
2003, Mechler 2004). While this is true to some extent, it represents only one side of the story. It 
has been argued elsewhere (for instance Balgah and Buchenrieder 2010) that the dynamism of 
informal response mechanisms does not seem to have received the attention it deserves, and has 
not been fully explored in the economic and social literature on natural disasters. This situation 
might be responsible for the underestimation of the role of informal instruments in managing large 
shocks. It is very likely that there is a substitution effect that takes place when state and market 
institutions fail in managing natural disasters (Skoufias 2003). This conjecture is based on the 
premise that households are never passive under disaster conditions. Experiencing a disaster 
often prepares households better to mitigate or cope with similar disasters in the future. Also, 
social processes embedded in individuals and communities might be drawn upon in case of a 
natural disaster. For instance endogenous norms of solidarity and reciprocity can be transformed 
into willful sharing of relief aid. This action can be strategically important to rapidly mitigate the 
primary impacts of a natural disaster such as a flood or drought (Balgah and Buchenrieder 2010). 
In this line, this article suggests a multi-stakeholder approach to disaster management in Africa – 
one in which both formal and informal instruments are utilized in the process, based on availability 
and existence strengths and weaknesses of the different (formal and informal instruments) in the 
particular disaster context.  
 
3. An operational framework for proper management of natural disaster  in 
Africa 
This chapter presents a theoretical framework that has been suggested to be relevant 
for theoretical and empirical analysis of natural disaster dynamics especially in 
developing countries. A framework that summarizes the contemporary theoretical 
position will be discussed first before proceeding to the multi-stakeholder framework 
comprehensively discussed by Balgah et al (2012). Both frameworks have been 
developed based on the World Bank’s Social Risk Management Framework (Alwang et 
al 2001, Holzmann and Jorgensen 2000, Heitzmann et al. 2001, Holzmann et al 2003) 
and the framework for the social dimensions of climate –related shocks (Agrawal 2008). 
The Social Risk Management Framework is the most widely used framework for 
conceptualizing and analyzing risks and shocks. This justifies its use as the basis for the 
discourse undertaken in this paper. The work of Agrawal (2008) is a unique contribution 
to the social aspects of shocks. Creating a novel framework guided by these two 
renowned sources allows the new product to effectively contribute to an innovative and 
more adapted framework for disaster management in Africa, without digressing too 
much from the contemporary discourse. 
The newly proposed conceptual framework concentrates on the theoretical dynamics of 
risks and shocks, their transformation into disasters, and the hypothetical situation 
specific for developing (African) countries.  
 
Figure 1 presents a general theoretical framework for risks and shock dynamics 
representing the current state of the art. Striking shocks (sudden or slow developing 
events) can either be idiosyncratic, affecting only a few households (e.g. illness of a 
household member) or covariate, having an impact on a wider population (e.g. a flood 
or drought).  
 
Theory predicts on the one hand that in the wake of idiosyncratic shocks, market and 
informal response mechanisms could support individual households to appropriately 
manage shocks, accommodating their impacts and reducing negative outcomes and 
further exposure. The occurrence of covariate shocks on the other hand overwhelms 
informal and market mechanisms and must be managed through state intervention to 
evade disastrous, irreversible outcomes such as poverty and vulnerability (Alwang et al 
2001, Holzmann et al 2003). It should be mentioned here that the success of insurance 
markets is based on the fact that shocks are usually not correlated.  
 
That insurance markets are more likely to fail in the wake of larger and more frequent 
shocks is not new for those who are conversant with how the industry functions. 
Reinsurance schemes have often emerged to buffer such failures (Balgah et al 2012). 
This is also true for state mechanisms that are particularly prone to failure especially in 
developing countries (Macamo 2005, Makoba 2011). It is therefore a proper (or 
improper) mix of formal and informal management mechanisms that determine whether 
victims become resilient or further exposed in the event of a natural disaster. 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 1: Theoretical representation of natural disaster dynamics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Balgah et al (2012) 
 
A curious question relevant for understanding the effects of natural disasters on Africa’ 
development is: what happens in practice in many African countries where covariate 
shocks often occur under conditions characterized by failing states and markets? 
Conventional wisdom predicts disastrous, irreversible outcomes (Holzmann and 
Jorgensen 2000, Heitzmann et al. 2001, Günther and Harttgen 2009). The position of 
this article is that an improper understanding of the dynamics of informal response 
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mechanisms can be responsible for its underestimation for preventing, mitigating and 
coping with natural disasters. In fact a deeper understanding of how informal 
mechanisms fit within the formal sphere provides a clearer picture of the crucial role that 
the latter might play in managing risks and shocks for individuals, households and 
communities in developing countries (Balgah et al 2012). 
 
Figure 2 presents the conceived hypothetical, multi-stakeholder (multidimensional) 
framework for disaster management in African countries in particular, and developing 
countries in general. It is assumed that when covariate shocks occur, even failing states 
become welfare maximizing, usually for political reasons. However, informal responses 
are not passive in the process. Through learning, collective action, experience and 
ability to organize, informal instruments are subjected to dynamic processes that 
significantly improve their capacities to cope with aftermath of disasters (Campbell 
1999, Balgah et al 2012).  
 
A critical issue on this framework is the emergence and consolidation of informal 
institutions in formalized, persistent nonprofit or community based organizations that 
proven crucial for short and long term management of natural disasters in many African 
countries. In addition, the role of external actors in disaster management is clearly 
demonstrated. External actors often include nonprofit organizations that emerge for 
altruistic motives especially with failing states and markets (Hansmann 1980, Steinberg 
2006), and are often consolidated in the long term. The actions of these organizations 
stimulate changes in the informal structures that remain stable long after the shock and 
contribute to long term risk reduction, adaptation and resilience. These change 
processes are more important when states and markets do not function properly. In the 
presence of active states and markets, nonprofit / community based organizations might 
act as watch dogs, ensuring that contracts between states, markets and communities 
are properly implemented (Steinberg 2006). For instance nonprofits can promote 
collaborative risk management between states and communities, social private risk 
management between communities and markets, and more rarely moderate public 
private partnerships for risk management (Balgah et al 2012). 
 In summary, the multi-stakeholder framework for proper disaster management with 
specific reference to developing countries suggests that the specific and omnipresent 
conditions of failing or dysfunctional states and markets warrant a serious consideration 
of the role of informal responses in managing both idiosyncratic and covariate shocks. 
These informal instruments can be conceptualized and analyzed as stand-alone 
mechanisms, as well as complementary to deficient state and market mechanisms. This 
framework is for a first instance particularly relevant for developing countries, where 
state and market failures for risk management are common. An important issue is 
always to define the boundary of the system (individual, community, village, province, 
country, (sub) region, etc) and therefore the unit of analysis. In this sense, anything 
occurring out of the boundaries will be considered external to the defined system. It is 
worth mentioning that there may also be internal shocks occurring within the boundaries 
of clearly defined systems. For simplicity reasons, this has not been indicated in the 
proposed framework. Nevertheless, whether shocks are internal or external to a system 
however defined will influence to what extent formal (state and market) and informal 
response mechanisms will be applied independently or collectively to prevent, mitigate 
or cope with the short, medium and long term effects(Balgah et al 2012). If informal 
mechanisms have been identified to be abundant in African countries (Holzmann and 
Jorgensen 2000), then it is just logical to make more use of such resources than do 
remain illusionary about proper functioning states and markets, that are scarcer to find 
on the continent. This in the opinion of the author is crucial for the effective 
management of natural disasters in Africa, in a manner that enhances sustainable 
development on the continent. 
 
Figure 2 Multidimensional framework for shock dynamics in developing 
countries 
 
 
 
Source: Balgah et al 2012 
 
4. Empirical evidence on the role of informal mechanisms in managing 
natural disasters 
This section provides some empirical evidence on the role of informal mechanisms in 
preventing, mitigating and coping with natural disasters. The empirical examples 
presented here are restricted to two African countries: Cameroon and Kenya, and an 
Asian country, Thailand. The choice of the case studies stems from the fact that 
Cameroon is located along a volcanic line, where disasters are frequent (Bang 2008). 
Kenya on the other hand is one of the countries in Africa with the highest frequency of 
famines and droughts (Guha-Sapir et al 2011). Natural disasters in this area of Africa 
have always been very devastating. It seems interesting to examine how informal 
mechanisms change over time, and how they have supported victims to cope especially 
with widespread disasters. The Asian case seeks for support for an extension of the 
framework discussed in this paper to other developing countries, especially in Asia, 
where the occurrence of natural disasters has always had its greatest impacts (ibid). 
The Asian case study is related to the 2004 Tsunamis which devastated many countries 
on the continent (Segschneider and Worakul 2007). 
 
4.1. Victim behavior after the 1986 Lake Nyos disaster in North West 
Cameroon: what is the role of informal mechanisms? 
On August 21st 1986, a natural gas explosion from Lake Nyos in the North West Region 
of Cameroon emitted Carbon dioxide and minimal amounts of Hydrogen sulphide 
asphyxiating over 1,700 inhabitants and almost all livestock in three villages (Nyos, 
Cha, Subum) located within a diameter of over 25 kilometers around the Lake (Bang 
2008). Later scientific investigations revealed that Lake Nyos contains a huge amount of 
Carbon dioxide (300 million cubic meters) in the deeper layers, with threats of further 
release in the future. While the scientific community was busy analyzing the cause of 
this natural disaster, a high level conference held in Yaoundé, Cameroon in March 1987 
proposed that surviving victims should be resettled immediately (Sigvaldson 1989). By 
the end of 1987, the first government-led resettlement had been effected in Buabua and 
Kimbi villages. Most households moved in the same year. The rest followed in 1988.  
The affected villages were declared disaster areas by the government and moving back 
was legally prohibited. With the objective to reduce risks and enhance safer 
rehabilitation, the Government and foreign partners embarked on a degassing project in 
1995. One full-fledged degassing column was installed and primed at Nyos in 2001, 
although five columns are needed to completely rule out the possibility of another 
lemnitic eruption (Halbwachs et al 2004).  
 
In a socioeconomic survey of surviving households of the disaster carried out in 
2009/10, it was observed that many surviving households had self-relocated back into 
the disaster zone in the last decade in spite of government restriction. Bang (2008) 
suggests that a major motive for self-relocation is the deficiency of official post – 
disaster management to jointly address physical, structural and social risk mitigation. 
This conjecture was difficult to accept, considering that government efforts towards 
disaster risk reduction was visible during the field work. To answer the question why 
some households and not all had illegally returned to the disaster zone, we used 
experimental econometric approaches, combined with hypothetical questions in the 
administered questionnaire to illicit differentiated risk behavior between those who have 
returned and those who have not (Balgah and Buchenrieder 2011). As illustrated in 
Table I one of the key underlying factors that explain the differentiated behavior is the 
degree of risk aversion which is lower in relocating households (indicated by their 
willingness to participate by making any payments  in lottery games) compared to those 
who are stationary. This trend was maintained in the experimental games, giving us 
reason to argue that the decision to self-relocate or not is fundamentally explained by 
unobservable endogenously embedded risk taking abilities, the observable component 
of which is manifested in the action of relocating or not. Interestingly, the household size 
of non-mobile households (9) was significantly higher than for self-relocating 
households This seems logical as self relocation decisions are technically more difficult 
to arrive at in larger than smaller households. As suggested by Hedström and 
Swedberg (1996), a closer look at these underlying mechanisms provided deeper, fine 
grained explanations for the observed phenomenon of self relocation. In our sample of 
470 households, no single household was found with any form of comprehensive 
insurance policy. We conclude that households returning to the disaster zone have 
endogenous risk taking capacities that have little or nothing to do with state and market 
institutions. The mere fact that they are relocating illegally suggests that when state and 
market institutions cannot provide security to victims, they may develop endogenous 
approaches that help them to manage the risks they are exposed to. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Source: Balgah and Buchenrieder (2011) 
4.2. Social mechanisms and responses to drought in Southern Kenya 
Drought – related food security has been a common and almost regular phenomenon in 
the Horn of Africa, and in Kenya in particular. Drought frequency is predicted to increase 
with changing climate (Mworia and Kinyamario 2008). Responding to droughts in Kenya 
has never been the sole business of the state and insurance markets. Community 
institutions and nonprofit organizations have often played an important role (Campbell 
1999). In an attempt  to study the evolution of community based, socially embedded 
informal response to drought in Southern Kenya, Campbell (1999) examined a panel 
data set spanning over a 20 year period, that is 1972-76 and 1994 -95: two strategic 
periods over which southern Kenya was stroke by two independent droughts. He 
Table I.  Hypothetical willingness to pay for lottery tickets by 
household type 
Possible win 
Payment 
categories 
Resettled
(%) 
Relocated P 
Likelihood 
ratio 
Up to 100 USD 
(50,000 FCFA) 
0 FCFA 83.8 41.7 
.002 .001 
> 0 FCFA 16.2 58.3 
Up to 2000 USD 
(1,000,000 
FCFA) 
0 FCFA 83.8 41.7 
.001 .000 
> 0 FCFA 16.2 58.3 
Up to 4,000 USD 
(2,000,000 
FCFA) 
0 FCFA 83.8 41.7 
.003 .002 > 0 FCFA 16.2 58.3 
 
Note:       1 USD is exchanged for approximately 500 FCFA 
concluded that there was a dynamic response on the rural communities prone to 
drought – related food security over the examined period. In fact the “driving forces of 
change emanating from national and international scales created the broad context for 
change and local processes embedded in a community’s interaction with the natural 
resource mediated these forces (Campbell 1999: 379). In the 1970s, the predominantly 
Massai communities in southern Kenya were nomadic livestock farmers and hunters, 
while the minority Kikiyu and Kamba tribes were crop farmers. Marriages were 
predominantly intra-tribal. In the late 1990s, intermarriage was more common than ever 
before. This informal risk management strategy has been adopted by many households 
based on their drought – related experiences over the years, since droughts often 
affected crops and livestock differently. In additon some Massai were found in the 90s 
to include crop cultivation in their production systems and many were traders. 
Ecotourism had significantly replaced hunting amongst the Massai and this once much 
closed society was now significantly exposed to the international community. 
Horticulture had emerged as an important activity in the region that strategically 
benefited from the intermarriage systems between Massai and other tribes.  
 
Strategic response to natural disasters was different in the 1970s as in the 90s. While 
there was a total dependence on (state) institutional support to cope with the disaster of 
the 70s, an increased proportion of farmers “sought assistance from family and friends 
[during] the 1994-95 hardship” (Campbell 1999:402). There was also an increase in 
savings of food and cash as means to reduce vulnerability to food shortages over the 
examined period in the research area. This case does shows clearly that informal 
mechanisms are dynamic and can fit well in a proper mix of instruments destined for the 
proper management of natural disasters in Africa. Such an approach has potentials for 
promoting Africa’s development. 
 
4.3. Informal responses and recovery after the 2004 Tsunamis in Asia: 
the case of Thailand 
The Tsunamis of December 2004 impacted devastating effects on many Asian 
countries.  In northern Thailand for example, it rendered most inhabitants poor, creating 
losses that affected the whole Thai economy. Six provinces along the Andaman Coast 
were heavily destroyed, leaving 8,000 people dead. Coral reefs and coastal habitats 
were interfered with and the intrusion of sea water affected agricultural productivity. The 
estimated financial loss was US$ 2 billion, and the overall GDP growth of Thailand 
reduced by 0.4% (Segschneider and Worakul 2007).  
 
The Lampoon community in Takua Pa District was seriously affected by the Tsunami. 
Only 30 of 52 original families could be identified in the community after the disaster. 
Although a huge wave of aid swept into the affected communities after the retreat of the 
Tsunami, “many people in Lampoon had little opportunity to obtain any of this aid. The 
land [had been] cordoned off and many people were unable to enter and find the 
remains of their dead ones” (Santhaboa 2008: 9). The Lampoon community is not a 
fishing community, although it is located along the Andaman Coast. Its inhabitants are 
primarily former mining workers who migrated into the region in the 1970s but remained 
after the mining concessions had expired. In spite of land reforms in Thailand in the 
later part of the twentieth century, these villagers could not acquire land titles because 
the major mining companies rebuked such attempts claiming ownership over the land. 
In addition, land title issuing officers required bribes which community members were 
too poor to afford. Thus surviving households in Lampoon community were not only 
faced with the difficulty to access relief aid and identify their plots, but also with the 
problem of returning to this property after the disaster even if individual parcels could be 
identified. Tourism, the major source of income, had been destroyed by the natural 
shock and they were threatened and prohibited by the mining companies from 
rebuilding their houses. Only community mobilization and collective action brought 
progress.  
 
After a series of community meetings, four regional slum networks were formed. 
Villagers returned to the area on 4 February 2005 with the intention of reconstructing 
their houses. Fast, quality and cooperative work was needed, in addition to funding. 
Through community dialogue, each household agreed and contributed a lump sum of 
1,000 Baht for daily expenditures and a collective loan of 500,000 Baht for high cost 
activities and management (Santhanboa 2008). 1 US Dollar at the time was equivalent 
to 34.1 Thailand Baht (THB). The community decided on the construction of 30 houses 
(i.e. one house per surviving family). Some additional financial resources were obtained 
from non-governmental organizations such as The Thai Red Cross Society, Oxfam, 
World Vision and Plan International. Based on a budget drawn up and transparently 
managed by the stakeholders themselves, and with the employment of community 
labor, 30 houses were constructed in six months. A close examination of this case study 
by Santhanboa (2008) and Balgah and Buchenrieder (2010) suggests that socially 
embedded mechanisms such as the ability to organize and act collectively as well as 
endogenous cognitive social capital (such as solidarity and reciprocity) can help explain 
why these victimized households were able to return to their formal land and completely 
construct houses, in spite of evident resistance from the mining companies claiming 
ownership of the land. This conjecture is supported by a statement of one of the victims: 
 
“During those days, none of us had a good night’s sleep. After we started, more 
and more people began to join in. The rebuilding of houses was intended to 
become a community activity in order to strengthen the process [of reconstruction]” 
(Pi Yupin as quoted by Santhanboa 2008: 13).  Again, this case study 
demonstrates the power of informal responses in the management of natural 
disasters. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Development on the African continent has generally lagged behind other continents, 
even if significant economic progress has been reported in recent years. The increasing 
occurrence of natural disasters further threatens peace, security and sustainable 
development in many African countries. The impacts of disasters are often catastrophic. 
Microeconomic theory has attributed this to failing state and market institutions. This 
situation cannot be blamed on internal processes alone. While political leverage has 
been seen as a key factor in state and market failure in many African countries, the 
World bank and IMF –imposed structural adjustment programs have been described as 
crucial in disciplining the African states. Predicted economic growth through market 
liberalization did not take place as expected. At the same time the regulatory functions 
of the state on the market was equally reduced. 
 
In spite of this prevailing situation, the continent has had to deal with increasing natural 
disasters in the last two decades or so. Formal (state and market) institutions that are 
theorized to accommodate large disasters were not fully effective. At the same time, the 
place of informal mechanisms that are abundant in the social fabric of many African 
societies has not be fully considered. 
This paper has argued that for natural disasters to be properly managed in order to 
enhance Africa’s development, there is a need to adopt a multi-stakeholder approach 
that goes beyond the state-market paradigm, an pays more attention to the role that 
informal responses can play independently or together with the formal ones. This 
framework has been presented and discussed, and published empirical case studies 
provided to substantiate the theoretical argument. The discourse undertaken here has 
some implications for research and disaster management in African and other countries. 
 
Firstly, the role of informal mechanisms do not seem to be restricted to idiosyncratic 
(individual) shocks as currently conceived in the topical literature. The empirical case 
studies demonstrate that even under conditions of large disasters, informal mechanisms 
can be very useful. There is a need for further research on this issue, in order to 
develop a new line of theory. 
Secondly, it seems as if formal responses become much more important when states 
and markets are missing of function only partially. This is demonstrated in the 
Cameroonian case study where disaster victims – after waiting for a quarter of a century 
– decide to return illegally into the disaster zone. State intervention has been restricted 
to ceremonious events yearly, and households are not hooked up to the insurance 
markets. Because households are never passive in the face of natural disasters, it is 
just logical that these victims resort to informal responses under these conditions. 
Research should therefore concentrate on understanding under what conditions 
disaster victims will adopt formal or informal mechanisms, or both for managing natural 
disasters. Irrespective of the determinants, the position of this article is that a proper mix 
of formal and informal mechanisms is necessary for a proper management of natural 
disasters in Africa, in a manner that enhances long term development. 
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